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Abstract 
 The Australian grape-growing and wine producing industry enjoyed meteoric growth from the 
early 1990s onwards, with wine sales forming an increasingly important element of both national 
export earnings and farm-sector income. Despite this success, a recent downward slump in 
industry profitability and a dampening of demand for wine has resulted in a call for government-
assisted intervention, which would include a national „vine-pull‟. This paper examines the „Wine 
Restructuring Action Agenda‟ (WRAA) proposed by a suite of industry bodies, and in particular 
the vine-pull policy option, in light of its predecessor, the vine-pull scheme of 1985-87. We 
argue that past experience suggests that both state and federal governments, and the industry 
itself, ought to explore the other options contained in the WRAA more fully, and indeed other 
emerging proposals for industry innovation and „light touch‟ regulation, when addressing the 
long-term sustainability of the Australian wine industry. 
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1. Introduction  
It is difficult to over-state the expansion of Australian wine industry in the last two decades. This 
illustrated by Table 1. 
Table 1: The Australian wine industry, 1990/91 to 2010/11 
  1990-91 1995-96 2000-01 2004-05 2007-08 2010-11 
Total bearing vine area (ha) 61 362 80 574 148 269 166 666 166 197 171 000 
No. of wineries crushing > 50t -- 222 351 413 384 -- 
Total production (million litres) 346 606 1 035 1 442 1 257 -- 
Export volume (million litres) 57 130 339 661 714.7 740 
Export value (A$ million) 180 472 1 614 2 748 2 680 2 570 
Average export unit value: $/litre -- 3.63 5.17 4.05 3.75 3.51 
Domestic consumption (litres/capita) 17.8 18.3 20.5 21.8 29.0 -- 
Sources:    Grant, Dollery and Hearfield (2011: 168); ABS, 1329.0 – Australian Wine and Grape Industry, various 
years; Jackson, et al., 2009). 
Note:          Projections to 2010-11 are derived from ABARE (Jackson, et al., 2009) which provides forward 
estimates of total crush, not total production in million litres, nor the number of wineries or domestic consumption in 
litres per capita. 
Table 1 demonstrates that the value of wine exports in 1990-91 represented a mere 6.5 per cent 
of what they had reached by 2004-05. Furthermore, the number of wineries crushing more than 
50 tonnes increased from 222 in 1995-96 to 384 in 2007-08, with an alternative count of wineries 
(i.e.: inclusive of those crushing less than 50 tonnes) rising from 617 in 1990-91 to 1,899 in 
2004-05 (Banks, et al., 2007: 17). Moreover, both grape growing and wine production are now 
geographically dispersed throughout Australia, with the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics (ABARE, 2009) listing eighty six producing regions and as many 
subregions. This suggests that grape cultivation and wine production have proved immensely 
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beneficial to many struggling parts of rural and regional Australia, especially smaller farm 
holdings (see, for example, Davidson and Grant, 2001: 296).  
However, an alternative portrait of the grape-cultivating and wine-making industries began to 
emerge in the course of 2007-08. Alongside the increase in crush from 2006-07 to 2007-08, the 
value of Australian wine sold domestically declined by 4 per cent in that financial year (Jackson, 
et al., 2009: 2). The quantity of wine exported dropped 9.2 per cent to 714.7 million litres, and 
the unit value of wine exported also decreased by 6.9 per cent. Table 1 demonstrates that the unit 
value of exported wine has declined since 2000-01, from $5.17 per litre to an estimated $3.51 per 
litre in 2010-11. Perhaps most alarmingly for local producers, the value of wine imported into 
Australia in 2007-08 increased by 40.8 per cent from 2006-07 to $431.4 million (ABS, 2009). 
This represented 16.5 per cent of the value of exports for the same year and 11 per cent of total 
domestic consumption, up from 7 per cent in the previous year (ABS, 2009). Moreover, imported 
wine is expected to represent 18 per cent of domestic consumption by 2013-14 (Jackson, et al., 
2009: 2). 
A more worrying aspect of financial sustainability in the industry is gleaned from recent forward 
projections. ABARE has forecast production continuing to increase by 14 per cent to 1.8 million 
tonnes for 2009-10 (Jackson, 2009: 8-11). Over-supply is by no means the only problem. The 
same Report concluded that global consumption of wine is stagnant (principally due to 
demographic changes in the major wine drinking nations of the world), yet global production 
continues to increase, with fierce competition in export markets for Australian products. This has 
been amplified by lower production costs in many of Australia‟s New World competitors. 
Moreover, recent market trends have seen Australian exports shifting to lower-end, off-premise 
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sales in its two main markets of the United Kingdom and the United States. In real terms, „wine 
grape prices in 2004-05 were only one-third of their level in 1997-89‟ (Sheales, et al., 2006: 3). 
Looming behind this decline in real prices is the fact that stocks of wine in Australia have 
continued to increase – to somewhere between 1.9 and 2.3 years worth of sales, „with the current 
surplus stockpile calculated at more than 100 million cases [set] to double in two years if current 
levels of production and demand persist‟ (Gent, 2010: 2).  
While ABARE (see, for example, Sheales, et al., 2006) has recognised the multi-dimensional 
nature of the problem, the Australian wine industry has focused on the specific issue of over-
supply and the policy option of a vine pull scheme (VPS) as a mechanism to address this 
problem. For example, Doug Lehmann, Managing Director of Peter Lehmann Wines, has called 
for 20,000-40,000 hectares of vines, equating to 270,000 to 500,000 tonnes of grapes (or 
amounting to 20-40 million cases of wine) to be pulled (Greenblat, 2010a), with others in the 
industry echoing this call (see, for instance, Greenblat, 2010b). On 10 November 2009 a Joint 
Statement and Supporting Report were released by four industry organisations, the Winemakers‟ 
Federation of Australia (WFA), the Wine Grape Growers‟ Association (WGGA), the Australian 
Wine and Brandy Corporation (AWBC) and the Grape and Wine Research and Development 
Corporation (GWRDC). The statement called for a range of measures to be introduced by 
government, including „improved exit packages for growers and small wineries seeking to leave 
the industry along the lines of drought and small block irrigator exit packages‟ (WFA, 2009a: 3) 
-- in effect, a government-sponsored exit strategy conforming to the calls for a VPS.  
Yet how tenable is the argument that a VPS – whatever its eventual form – would alleviate the 
problems of the Australian wine industry? Is not pursuing such a policy turning back the clock to 
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what Lloyd (2003) described as a „regime‟ of protectionism, thereby dismissing the contribution 
of market reforms of the 1980s-2000s? More importantly, what alternative policy directions are 
available for the grape-growing and wine-making industries and the regions in which they are 
now embedded? The present paper considers these questions.  
The paper is divided into five main parts. Section two examines in detail the argument for a VPS 
as part of the „Wine Restructuring Action Agenda‟. Section three provides an account of the last 
time a VPS was implemented in Australia, over the period 1985-87, by way of an exposition of 
Gow et al. (1991) noting the direction of the policy and the outcomes, which in some instances, 
proved perverse. Section four argues that while there are some limits to the validity of the 
comparison between the VPS of 1985-87 on the one hand and any scheme launched in the 
foreseeable future on the other hand, the experience of the previous VPS ought to inform the 
debate surrounding calls for a similar scheme today. With this in mind, the paper reiterates the 
relevance of options for the industry canvassed elsewhere. The paper concludes in section five 
with some brief general observations for future research. 
2. The Wine Restructuring Action Agenda (WRAA)  
On 10 November 2009 two documents were released by the four industry organisations: a Joint 
Statement entitled „Wine industry must confront the reality of oversupply‟ (WFA, 2009a) and a 
Supporting Report „Wine Restructuring Action Agenda‟ (WRAA) (WFA, 2009b). The 
Supporting Report identified what it referred to as „key drivers‟ behind the WRAA:  
• Australia‟s wine oversupply exceeds 100 million cases and at the current 
production rate this will more than double in three years. 
• The scale of the problem is such that we cannot expect normal market forces or 
external factors to solve it. 
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• Even ambitious sales growth ambitions in new markets would eliminate less 
than a quarter of the oversupply. 
• The combined impact of drought, water shortages and climate change would 
over time eliminate less than one-tenth of the oversupply. 
• Too much current activity is not viable in terms of competitiveness, margins and 
target market demand. 
• The problems relate both to demand and supply. 
(WFA, 2009b: 1). 
Moreover, the Supporting Report claimed that a number of factors, including multi-year set price 
contracts, the continued demand for bulk wine and unrealistic expectations about the increasing 
value of export market growth „are distorting market signals and allowing uneconomic supply to 
continue. (WFA, 2009b: 1). 
While the Supporting Report conceded that the problems of the industry „relate to both demand 
and supply‟, the overall thrust of both documents suggests that government intervention, or 
extraordinary action by the industry itself, or both, is necessary to alleviate the problem of 
oversupply. Thus, „we cannot expect normal market forces or external factors to solve it‟; „even 
ambitious sales growth in new markets would eliminate less than a quarter of the oversupply‟, 
and „the combined impact of drought, water shortages and [even] climate change‟ will not 
address the problem, with significant „market distortions‟ embedded in the industry (WFA, 
2009b). 
Moreover, unviable activity was identified, in particular a „significant number of smaller 
“lifestyle” producers who can tolerate unprofitable businesses due to off-farm income‟. In this 
context, the two methods by which economic viability was assessed are worthy of examination 
in more detail. The most straightforward, a report prepared by the AWBC, entitled Winegrape 
Purchases: Price Dispersion Report 2009 (AWBC, 2009), collected data on the purchasing price 
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of tonnages of wine grapes. The data was comprehensive, recording more than 36,000 
transactions or 80 per cent of all purchases in the year 2009. It found that the average price for 
the „just over one million tonnes surveyed was $527 per tonne compared with $717 per tonne in 
2008‟ (WFA, 2009b: 5). The alternative study, by industry analyst Gaetjens Langley, first 
developed a benchmarking system for grading fruit (from A to E), then defined the fruit as 
uneconomic „if it was too costly for the quality achieved‟ (WFA, 2009b: 5). The results are 
shown in Table 2 and Table 3 reproduced here. 
Table 2:          Australian wine industry: Costs of production, indicative prices and tonnage 
by grape grade in 2008 
Wine grape grade Indicative yield 
(Tonnes/ha) 
Vineyard 
cost/ha 
Direct 
cost/tonne 
Wholesale 
price 
FOB/litre 
packaged 
Indicative 
Domestic 
retail 
price/litre 
Tonnes 
A (Speciality) 5 $9,500 $1,900 >$10 >25 
180,850 
B (Super Premium) 7 $8,000 $1,143 $7.50-$9.99 $15-$25 
C (Premium) 12 $6,750 $563 $5.00-$7.50 $8-$15 409,552 
D (Popular Premium) 16 $6,250 $391 $2.50-$4.99 $5-$8 553,211 
E (Basic) 25 $5,750 $230 <$2.50 <$5 652,116 
Not classified, balancing 
item to 2008 crush total           
35,794 
Source: Gaetjens Langley, quoted in WFA (2009b: 5).  
In Table 2, Gaetjens Langley estimated that the industry is particularly vulnerable at quality 
classifications C and D (where direct costs per tonne are estimated to be $6,750/tonne and 
$6,250/tonne respectively and the yield per hectare is significantly greater than both grades A 
and B). Moreover, the sum of these two categories in terms of tonnage – 962,763 – outweighs 
the sum of categories A, B and E together – 868,760 – and herein, according to Gaetjens 
Langley, lies the core of the problem: too much middle-grade fruit with too high a cost structure 
of production.   
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Table 3:          Australian wine industry: Uneconomic grapes (cost factors only) in 2008 
Quality Classification Total Tonnage Noneconomic Tonnage % Noneconomic 
A & B 180,850 n/a n/a 
C 409,552 147,241 36.0 
D 553,211 134,517 24.3 
E 652,116 25,592 3.9 
F 1,795,729 307,350 17.1 
1.       Uneconomic defined by cost of production only, no allowance for lack of demand. 
2.       All A & B assumed economic irrespective of production costs. 
Source: Gaetjens Langley, quoted in WFA (2009b: 5).  
There are significant questions that could be asked of this analysis. For example, data in Table 3 
are based on „cost of production only‟ and, strangely, „all A and B [grade fruit] is assumed 
economic irrespective of production costs‟ (Table 3, Note 2; emphasis added). This raises 
questions about of how categories C, D and E were assessed, and more importantly, why this 
assessment was not applied to categories A and B.[1] In any event, the Supporting Report has a 
story to tell about the necessity of culling middle-grade fruit production in Australia due to its 
inefficient nature, and the malign contribution that „small‟ and „lifestyle‟ producers make to 
profitability. As such, the Supporting Report seeks a rationalisation in favour of large players, at 
the expense of smaller growers and winemakers for which involvement in grapes and wine may 
be a secondary economic activity, or an example of „on-farm horizontal diversification‟.  
The resultant four-pronged „Wine Restructuring Action Agenda (WRAA) is cited here in toto: 
1.      From 23 November 2009, detailed and confidential supply data summaries will be provided 
to regional associations. These will examine each region in isolation and in relation to the 
national picture, with a focus on levels and patterns of viability. 
2.      From 30 January 2010, a package of tools will be available to help individual vineyard 
operators assess their performance and viability. This will include: a checklist; an upgraded 
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Deloitte Ready Reckoner to assess winery profitability by market, channel and price point; and 
an upgraded Vinebiz program to assess vineyard profitability. 
3.      From early next year, briefings will be held in 14 regional centres (covering all states) to 
discuss regional data and issues and offer business stress testing to assist with decision making. 
The Federal Government has been approached to help facilitate this initiative, and State input is 
being sought. 
4.      WFA and WGGA will hold discussions with the Federal Government about improved exit 
packages for growers and small wineries seeking to leave the industry along the lines of drought 
and small block irrigator exit packages. Discussions also will be held with State Government 
agencies with regard to alternative land use options in wine regions. 
 (WFA, 2009b: 3). 
Initially, it would appear that only the fourth point, whereby the WFA and WGGA take a 
leadership role alongside the Commonwealth Government in developing „improved exit 
packages for growers and small wineries seeking to leave the industry along the lines of drought 
or small-block irrigator exit packages‟ signals a VPS – or at least the beginnings thereof. 
However, examination of the first three items suggests otherwise. Point 1 sees confidential data 
on the viability of specific regions being provided to regional organisations, „exam[ining] each 
region in isolation and in relation to the national picture‟. Point 2 sees the dissemination of two 
audit instruments – the Deloitte Ready Reckoner and Vinebiz – „to help individual vineyard 
operators assess their performance and viability‟. Point 3 prescribes a follow-up to the two self-
assessment exercises, organising growers/winemakers into ‟14 regional centres‟ to „discuss 
regional data and issues and [to] offer business stress testing to assist with decision making‟. In 
the absence of significant capital inside the industry as a mechanism by which more 
economically sustainable producers could buy out others, these recommendations amount to a 
VPS similar to the one touted in the media by large industry players.  
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The WRAA also asserted that other initiatives ought to be undertaken by the peak industry 
bodies, including working with the Commonwealth to revisit the WET Rebate so that it is not 
deployed to keep „unviable‟ businesses afloat, and refocussing research and development to 
include a marketing plan based in Northeast Asia and China. Nevertheless, the broad thrust of 
reforms falls squarely on the four immediate responses listed above.  
The level of government intervention into agricultural commodity production proposed in the 
WRAA is by no means without precedent (for an historical overview see Lloyd, 2003; for more 
specific account of Rural Adjustment Schemes, see Cockfield and Botterill, 2006 and Gow and 
Davidson, 1996). Yet this has been increasingly less the case under what some (see, for example, 
Davidson and Grant, 2001) have referred to as the „neo-liberal‟ agenda of successive 
Commonwealth Governments from 1983. The broad theoretical reasons as to why such 
approaches to market intervention have been expunged from the armoury of policy options are 
well rehearsed, and have been examined in a number of contexts, including the Keating 
Government‟s drought relief policies of the mid-1990s (Gow, 1994). Setting aside these 
theoretical arguments, what evidence is at hand to support the idea that the proposed scheme 
would contribute to the desired result – namely, a financially sustainable, globally competitive 
industry which nevertheless offers wine consumers – the people who are going to pay for the 
implementation of such a scheme – choice and value for money when purchasing their wine? It 
is to an assessment of the 1985-87 VPS that we now turn. 
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3. The 1985-87 VPS  
Originally intended exclusively for the dried fruit vine industry following from an Industry 
Assistance Commission (IAC) Inquiry in 1983, the 1985-87 VPS nevertheless spilled over into 
the wine grape growing industry following the McKay Inquiry that commenced in that same 
year. In announcing the Scheme on 26 March 1985, the then Commonwealth Minister for 
Primary Industry stated that there was a need for structural adjustment „because of a massive 
over-supply on world markets and high domestic production‟ (Gow et al., 1991: 31) – the same 
core reasons identified by the WRAA.  
Over a period of two years, approximately $8.8 million was spent by the Commonwealth and the 
three state governments that decided to implement the scheme (South Australia, Victoria and 
Queensland), with the vast majority ($6.2 million) being spent on wine grape removal in South 
Australia. With the completion of the Scheme, 2,700 ha (or 8 per cent of annual winery intake) 
was removed from the national crush. By contrast, 802 ha (a mere 3 per cent) of dried fruit vine 
was removed from production.  
In their overall assessment, Gow et al. (1991) were highly critical of the impacts of the scheme. 
They argued that after taking into account normal removal of grapes (or „grubbing‟, due to vine 
age, changes in demand, etc.), „the net effect of the scheme was at most to increase grubbings by 
only 400 hectares‟ or approximately 1.5% of annual winery intake. Further, they argued that „it 
seems difficult to avoid drawing the conclusion that the primary impact of the scheme was to 
bring forward intended grubbings of aged vines which were nearing the end of their productive 
life‟ (Gow et al., 1991: 40). Moreover, while the VPS was originally designed to assist the dried 
fruit industry, eventually only 22 per cent of funds were directed to this goal, principally due to 
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an upswing in global demand for dried fruits at the commencement of the implementation of the 
Scheme.  
In the current context, the question of relevance is: To what extent are the reasons for the poor 
policy outcomes particular to the 1985-87 VPS, or alternatively, are there systemic problems 
with vine-pulling as a mechanism to adjust supply? The answer to this question lays in both the 
details and the unforseen policy outcomes of the Scheme. The 1985-87 VPS had two distinct 
policy goals: one to restructure both grape industries such that they were profitable and 
sustainable, the other to provide for the welfare of marginal farm populations through the 
implementation of rural adjustment assistance – ostensibly, precisely the same goals of the 
current proposal. However, at the time, both the South Australian and NSW Departments of 
Agriculture were highly critical of any attempt to achieve these two policy goals through a VPS. 
For example, in its submission to the McKay Inquiry, the NSW Department of Agriculture 
stated: 
Neither a Vine Pull Scheme nor the RAS [Rural Adjustment Scheme] is considered appropriate for distributing 
welfare payments. Welfare assistance would be provided more efficiently through direct income grants 
(unemployment benefits are a good example) rather than resource-based schemes. Apart from the problems of 
distorting the use of resources in favour of the underwritten resource, there is no guarantee that assistance 
distributed on the basis of resource-use will correspond to the welfare objectives of the Government... 
 (McKay, et al. 1985, 34-35, quoted in Gow et al., 1991: 32) 
Nor was it was merely the conflation of the two policy goals that were of concern. Both State 
Departments asserted that there was a lack of suitable alternative crops to grapes in their 
respective states and that the problem of over-supply might well be transferred to another 
industry. NSW Department of Agriculture argued that the problem of oversupply may well be 
short-lived. South Australia argued that a regional focus, rather than a state-based approach, was 
more suited to the problem (Gow et al., 1991: 35-37). 
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In addressing the question of why the Scheme faltered, particularly in relation to the dried fruit 
vines that it initially attempted to target, Gow et al. (1991) offered several observations. First, 
they noted that fruit production by vines is inherently unresponsive to market signals (despite the 
fickle nature of the market) because the planning horizon of production is thirty to forty years – 
the producing life of a vine. As such, producers are better off taking a reduced price – even a 
price that falls well below the cost of production – for several consecutive years because the term 
of investment is so long.  
Second, this structure of unresponsiveness was exacerbated in the case of dried fruit vine 
production due to government regulation at the time. This included an exemption from Section 
45 of the Trade Practices Act (1974) (the Section prohibiting price fixing, monopolisation and 
exclusive dealing) such that a sophisticated equalisation scheme, in effect a two-price scheme, 
could be in place (Gow et al., 1991: 17). In addition, the two markets were also overseen by 
separate bureaucracies (the Australian Dried Vine Fruits Association (ADFA) domestically, and 
the Australian Dried Fruits Corporation (ADFC) for export sales and marketing (in a „single 
desk‟ mode). Further, sultana producers also benefited from Commonwealth Government 
underwriting, which guaranteed a minimum return on dried sultana production equal to 80 per 
cent of an estimated average of equalised returns over the previous three seasons‟ (Gow et al., 
1991: 19). These extreme levels of protection significantly insulated growers from price signals.  
Third, Gow et al. (1991: 56) noted that, in contrast to the ineffectual result with respect to dried 
fruit, the Scheme did result in some multi-purpose wine grapes being pulled that were used for 
wines that „certainly appear [ed] to be in long term decline‟, namely „those varieties used in 
fortified and table red wines‟ (Gow et al., 1991: 58; emphasis added). However, with greater 
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hindsight, even this measured level of success is subject to qualification. The decline of demand 
for fortified wines has indeed decreased. While it may now appear inevitable that this has 
occurred, this is not necessarily the case. Moreover, the red table wines that were pulled under 
the scheme were old vines – the mainstay of quality wine in the industry today – and a fact often 
now lamented (see, for example, Hughson, 2010). One of the main points to be derived from the 
analysis of Gow et al. (1991) is that in „picking losers‟ by way of a VPS necessarily confines the 
industry to the winners that are left, rather than taking the more considered approach of attrition 
(grubbing) over time.  
In turning their attention to the adjustment (or welfare) objective of the 1985-87 VPS, Gow et al. 
(1991: 62-70) found that many grape-growing enterprises were „uneconomic‟ when assessed 
from the perspective of grape-growing only. However, this proportion shrunk approximately 10 
per cent when other forms of income (both on-farm and off-farm) were taken into account. 
However, VPS did not target this small percentage of marginal grape growers exclusively. On 
the contrary: for the first year of its operation in South Australia, the scheme was available 
without restriction, i. e.: neither means-tested, nor prescribed as clear fell (as opposed to partial 
pull). In Victoria, the Scheme was initially restricted to multi-purpose grape producers for clear 
felling only; but it was undersubscribed to the extent that both these restrictions were removed. 
Gow et al. (1991: 68) concluded that not only was assistance offered to financially successful 
grape-growers (who were in a position to adjust slowly) it was also offered to what they referred 
to as „lifestyle‟ producers and „hobby farmers‟. 
In examining possible improvements to the 1985-87 VPS, Gow et al. (1991: 71-77) first 
reiterated Stiglitz‟s (1986) observations of government programs generally; that the details of 
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provisions are paramount, and that these may be more difficult than defining the original 
problem. Moreover, they noted that there is often a trade-off between the formulation of criteria 
on the one hand and the ease of their implementation on the other hand (see, Wallis and Dollery 
1999, for a detailed analysis of government failure). They also illustrated how the VPS tripped 
up on its own methodology: A foundational element of the application of the Scheme was land 
area – assistance payments were acreage-based. Yet two variables immediately confounded this 
seemingly obvious choice of definition so as to render it simplistic. The first was that yield per 
acre varies by variety of grape: Gow et al. pointed to the example of Muscat Gordo Blanco 
yielding approximately 40 tonnes per hectare compared to Shiraz yielding some 6 tonnes per 
hectare. While as a varietal in its own right shiraz will bring a higher price per tonne, this price 
premium would rarely exceed 50 per cent. As such, „the attractiveness provided through the 
Scheme was substantially lower for multi-purpose varieties than for dryland wine grape 
varieties‟ (Gow, et al., 1991: 72). 
We are thus faced with not merely Stiglitz‟s insistence of the intrinsic difficulties of designing a 
well-targeted government program but with the perverse policy outcome that Shiraz – one of the 
stalwarts of the ensuing and growing Australian wine industry – became devalued against 
Muscat Gordo Blanco – grapes used to make sherry. In the face of any mooted VPS in the 
contemporary context, it is worth bringing unintended policy outcomes of the 1985-87 VPS to 
the fore. Gow et al. (1991: 56) summed up the Scheme as „prompted by a temporary, albeit 
prolonged, decline in world prices‟, resultant in destruction of long term assets such as vine 
stocks‟, with „the low participation rate in the Scheme perhaps being fortuitous (Gow et al., 
1991: 56). 
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Nevertheless, a sudden recovery in export prices for Australian wine is remote in the present 
global market. The Australian industry does face a systemic oversupply problem from which 
many other negative impacts are derived. It is to the alleviation of this problem that we now turn. 
4. Lessons learned  
The immediate objection to comparing the experience of the 1985-87 VPS and the one now 
proposed is that the situations are so different. In particular, both the welfare component of the 
1985-87 VPS and the radical change in the regulatory framework mark significant change. Yet 
these differences may be more apparent than real. In the first instance, there is, in fact, a welfare 
component attached to the structural adjustment process envisioned in the WRAA. The agenda 
clearly advocates government-assisted exit of small players for the benefit of larger players. As 
such, it may not be a particularly defensible welfare outcome, but it is an outcome nonetheless. 
Second, with regard to the differences in regulatory environments, the then regime of industry 
protection was a bureaucratic edifice when seen alongside the minimal tariff regime for wines 
imported into Australia and the occasional tax concession to the industry. However, to 
implement the WRAA in its proposed form would immediately negate the principle that has 
underlain the growth of the industry for the last twenty years, namely, that of minimal 
government interference. Under the scenario of VPS proposed by the WRAA, the very least 
problem would be those identified by Stiglitz (1986) and reiterated by Gow et al. (1991) – that 
assistance programs are notoriously difficult to design, and that the trade-off between 
successfully designing criteria and ease of implementation has to be taken into consideration. 
Rather, as the account of the 1985-87 VPS clearly demonstrates, it is the unintended, and in 
some instances perverse consequences of policy that prove most problematic. Indeed the 
Australasian Agribusiness Perspectives Vol. 19, Paper 89, 10/5/11 Grant, Gow & Dollery 
17 
 
negative outcomes of adjustment/welfare policy which amply demonstrate in favour of the 
general principle that, in the case of grape-growing and wine making, government ought to let 
supply and production correct itself in accordance with demand.  
If elements of the proposed WRAA are as problematic as this paper has argued, the most 
pressing question is that of what steps can be taken – by the industry and those that decide the 
regulatory framework – to improve the outlook, not just for the industry itself or a sectional 
interest therein (a la the WRAA), but more generally, and in particular for those disparate 
regions of Australia that now enjoy the benefits of a wine industry as part of their milieu? In fact, 
ABARE considered this question in some depth in a recent research report based on a 
comparative study of the McLaren Vale and Riverina wine regions as well as national and 
international data (Sheales et al., 2006). The Report did recognise that scale economies would be 
achieved from an increase in the average size of grower operations due to smaller operators 
exiting. However, it was adamant that this occur through competitive market forces, „because it 
allows the most efficient and forward-looking businesses to keep up with the pace of change‟ 
(Sheales, et al., 2006: 46). Further, it added the caveat that there „would be significant variation 
across regions‟ (Sheales et al., 2006: 38).  
The Report contained five additional broad recommendations. First, exploring the relevance of 
different business models such as „contracting, leasing, share-farming and cooperative 
arrangements designed to achieve better financial performance for growers and the industry as a 
whole‟. Second, investment into research and development, both at the farm level and in terms of 
product innovation. While these two recommendations may appear to be so general as to be trite, 
in fact options along these lines have been explored by way of comparative analysis between the 
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Australian industry and particular wine producing regions globally. For example, Grant et al. 
(2011) have considered the relevance of cooperative models of wine production and storage 
(such that the value per bottle accrues over time) used in Languedoc Roussillon to New England 
Australia, an emerging wine region north west of Sydney. Further, this research also explored the 
possibility of producing regional flagship wines from multiple regional vineyards, thereby 
branding the wine primarily in relation to regional signifiers rather than those of grape variety or 
individual enterprise. Conceivably, further inter-regional comparative research in this mode 
could be undertaken. 
Third, ABARE urged that relationships between growers and wineries be examined, with the 
goal of achieving clearer information about markets. Since the release of the WRAA, there has 
been a significant development on this front, with the NSW Legislative Council Standing 
Committee on State Development conducting an inquiry into the NSW wine grape market and 
prices (the Catanzariti Inquiry) from September to December 2011. The Inquiry‟s 
recommendations included increasing the stability of grape prices (by wineries publishing their 
prices by 30 June each year), as well as the introduction of an Industry Code of Conduct 
governing the payments schedules of wineries to producers and the development of model for 
„the collective marketing of grapes‟ in the Riverina in NSW‟s‟ south west (Catanzariti Inquiry, 
2010, 1-2). In this instance at least, the NSW government has acted relatively swiftly to 
introduce a range of „light touch‟ regulatory actions, the merits of which will be demonstrated 
with implementation. 
Fourth, ABARE recommended a general increased awareness of global market trends and 
finally, it directed traditional businesses to look for opportunities to add value in a context where 
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consumer demand was changing rapidly (Sheales et al., 2006: 5). Also, in common with the 
WRAA, it identified potential in new international markets (China, Russia, Germany and 
Southeast Asian countries) recommending in-country promotion, and argued, unlike the the 
WRAA and Supporting Report, that the Australian grape-growing industry has responded to the 
contraction in demand, with total new plantings falling considerably since 1997 (Sheales et al., 
2006: 31). 
However, the most striking element of the (2006) ABARE Research Report is the underlying 
principle change: 
Allowing the market to work, in Australia as well as in other ‘new’ and ‘old’ world producing 
countries, will provide the most efficient and effective solution to both the stocks overhang and 
low prices... Regulatory interventions will be costly, both financially and in terms of economic 
efficiency; they will not result in improved prices to growers as Australia is too small to 
influence the world market; and other competing suppliers to the world market will benefit less 
from Australian competition. 
(Sheales et al., 2006: 5). 
In sum, the recommendations of ABARE in 2006 look like a lot of hard work for the industry, 
alongside some farms -- though not necessarily the smaller and less efficient ones -- exiting the 
industry. Nevertheless, ABARE is clear that a VPS, or indeed any significant intervention by 
government, ought not to be entertained. 
5. Concluding remarks  
The arguments marshalled in this paper have alerted us to some important questions for future 
research. Perhaps the most of pressing of these is a critical exposition of the two accounting 
instruments – Deloitte‟s Ready Reckoner and Vinebiz – that under the WRAA plan these will be 
comprehensively distributed to industry participants. They currently circulate widely throughout 
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the industry (Reddaway, 2009) and are freely available. What are their methodologies, are there 
alternatives and to what extent are these instruments suitable?  
Secondly, the authors of the WRAA have presented the case for a rationalisation of the industry 
through expunging smaller „inefficient‟ players. But it is possible that there is a contra argument. 
The investigation of the 1985-87 VPS demonstrated that, when assessed from the perspective of 
viticulture and winemaking alone, many businesses in South Australia were not financially 
viable. However, viewed as mixed enterprises (inclusive of off-farm income) only 10 per cent 
were assessed as marginal. To what extent do enterprises of this kind form a constitutive element 
of wine regions – both in terms of grape-farming, but also in terms of their contribution through 
other economic activity -- constitutive of a resurgence of these regional areas? Empirical 
investigation of these and related questions would provide a useful antidote to the view of the 
future of the industry implied by the WRAA, namely, one where the interests of larger producers 
in particular geographic regions take precedence over those smaller producers in diverse and 
emerging regions throughout the country. 
Prima face it would appear that there is more than the profitability of the wine industry at stake 
here: rather, wine production can be conceived as just one element in a tapestry of food, wine 
and culture experiences which form the basis of what Trubek (2009) recently labelled „the taste 
of place‟. The possibilities for – and limits to – this type of economic activity and the way that all 
three levels of government in Australia choose to interface with these possibilities are important, 
and indeed urgent questions. 
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[1]
 An attempt to obtain the original benchmarking report from Gaetjens Langley in order that its methodology be 
more rigorously examined was met with a polite refusal to provide the document (Grant, 2010, pers. com). 
 
